Introduction Sinnott-Armstrong (2011) defines moral skepticism as, “a diverse collection of views that deny or raise doubts about various roles of reason in morality.” There are many different versions of skepticism; for example, some deny the possibility of possessing moral knowledge, reaching moral truth, having justified ethical beliefs, or plainly attaining reasons to act in accordance with moral principles. Debaters that advocate for moral skepticism usually do it on the negative but there have been some that read it on the affirmative. Consider the following example: If the resolution was, “Just governments ought to require employers to provide a living wage”, most affirmatives would generate an obligation to provide a living wage, i.e. living wages are key to avoiding extinction therefore beneficial under a consequentialist ethic or living wage are key to preventing exploitation, which is key under an oppression framework. Negatives reading moral skepticism would instead argue that we don’t have a moral obligation to do anything because of X, Y, Z reasons and therefore we don’t have an obligation to provide a living wage.