After I posted an irritated Facebook status about debaters’ misuse of the term “truth-functional,” Adam suggested that I write something for VBD to explain the terminological issue. The mistake is one worth rectifying, I think, if nothing else so that debaters will make themselves a greater credit to the activity when they talk to their philosophy professors in college. But it seems a bit unfair to clutter the debate webs with my own minor grievances, without throwing in something more constructive as well, so I thought I’d pair the clarification of terms with a little elucidation of the cognitivist/non-cognitivist distinction in metaethics which debaters mistakenly take “truth-functionality” to trace. This latter is something which many debaters grasp fairly well, but for those just starting to learn metaethics, I’ve found that it can be a little obscure, and easily confused with the realism/anti-realism distinction. Hopefully, then, this article will shed a little light on these basic dividing lines in metaethics, along with urging a change of expressions.